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Abstract
Merricks v Mastercard [2019] is the first action under the newly developed ‘opt-out’ 
collective proceedings regime for aggregate damages under UK competition 
law to be considered by the UK Court of Appeal. It is significant for both the 
level of damages (£14 billion (€16 billion)) and the clarification of the legal test 
at the certification stage for the suitability for an aggregate award: the method 
for calculation of the aggregate damages and the sufficiency of evidence. The 
Court’s lowering of these thresholds importantly opens the door to future class 
actions and reasserts the importance of collective proceedings as a  valuable 
means of redress for competition law infringements. The decision has now been 
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appealed to the UK Supreme Court where these issues may be further clarified and 
resolved.
Résumé 
Merricks v Mastercard [2019] est la première action examinée par la Cour d’appel du 
Royaume-Uni, dans le cadre du nouveau régime de procédure collective «opt-out» 
récemment mis au point en vertu du droit britannique de la concurrence. Cette action 
est importante tant pour le niveau des dommages (14 milliards de £; 16 milliards de 
€) que pour la clarification du test juridique au stade de la certification de l’aptitude 
à une indemnisation globale: la méthode de calcul du dommage et le caractère 
suffisant des preuves. L’abaissement de ces seuils par la Cour ouvre la voie à de 
futurs recours collectifs et réaffirme l’importance des procédures collectives en 
tant que moyen utile de réparation pour les infractions au droit de la concurrence. 
La décision a maintenant fait l’objet d’un appel devant la Cour suprême du 
Royaume-Uni, où ces questions peuvent être clarifiées et résolues.
Key words: UK Competition Law, EU Competition Law, class actions, collective 
proceedings, certification stage, damages.
JEL: K2, K3, L4, M2
I. Introduction
On the 16 April 2019, the UK Court of Appeal (Patten, Hamblen and 
Coulson LJJ) allowed an appeal by representative Walter Merricks against 
a  judgment of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter: CAT) 
refusing to grant a Collective Proceedings Order (hereinafter: CPO) against 
three companies in the Mastercard group.1 Merricks’ action seeks to represent 
an estimated class of 46.2 million people, in an aggregate award of damages 
worth £14.098 billion (€15.7 billion). Leave has been granted for an appeal of 
the decision to the UK Supreme Court.
This was the first action under the newly developed ‘opt-out’ collective 
proceedings regime for aggregate damages under UK competition law to 
be considered by the Court of Appeal. The judgment provides an important 
interpretation of the new legislative regime, in particular the standard of 
evidence required for a CPO application.2 
1 Merricks v Mastercard [2019] EWCA Civ 674 (UK Court of Appeal).
2 In Gibson v Pride Mobility Products (2017) CAT 9, the CAT had certified a CPO in 
a collective action for damages for losses by consumers who bought a scooter from one of 
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II. The UK legislative regime for collective proceedings
The UK regime for damages permits ‘stand-alone’ (where the applicant 
bears the burden of proof for the infringement) or ‘follow-on’ (the applicant 
can rely on a previous public or private decision and is relieved of proof 
of liability)3 actions to be brought before the CAT or High Court for 
damages arising under the Competition Act 1998 (CA) (UK) (s47A) and 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK) introduced amendments (ss 47B and 
47C CA) to allow the bringing of collective proceedings for these damages in 
the CAT. Section 47B requires that collective proceedings must be commenced 
by a person who proposes to be the representative (s47B(2)) and may only 
continue if the Tribunal makes a collective proceedings order (CPO) (s47B(4)). 
The Tribunal may make a CPO only if:
S47B (5)(a) …the person who brought the proceedings is a person who, if the 
order were made, the Tribunal could authorise to act as the representative in 
those proceedings; and
(5) (b)  in respect of claims which are eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings.
(6) Claims are eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings only if the Tribunal 
considers that they raise the same, similar or related issues of fact or law...
(7) A collective proceedings order must include the following matters— 
(a) authorisation of the person who brought the proceedings to act as the 
representative in those proceedings,
(b) description of a class of persons whose claims are eligible for inclusion in 
the proceedings.
The eligibility rules for a CPO under s.47B(6) are fur ther incorporated into 
Rule 77(1)(b) (Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (2015 No. 1648) made 
under s 15 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (‘the Rules’)) which directs eligibility to 
be determined in accordance with Rule 79.
Rule 79(1) states:
(1) The Tribunal may certify claims as eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings 
where, having regard to all the circumstances, it is satisfied by the proposed 
class representative that the claims sought to be included in the collective 
proceedings—
eight retailers found to be fixing resale prices in breach of the Competition Act 1998 (UK). The 
case was ultimately withdrawn however due to an error in the economic expert calculation of 
damages arising from the ‘follow-on’ action.
3 The decision is binding proof that the behavior took place and was illegal: Regulation 1/2003, 
Article 16; Competition Act 1998 (UK), s58A.
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(a) are brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons;
(b) raise common issues; and
(c) are suitable to be brought in collective proceedings.4
III. The private right to damages for breach of competition law
EU competition law places importance on the establishment of private 
rights to damages for loss caused by a breach of competition law.5 The UK 
collective damages provisions were introduced to facilitate these actions. 
These collective proceedings may be brought on an opt-out or opt-in basis. 
Prior to reform there was no UK direct equivalent of the US ‘opt-out’ model 
of class action for competition claims in which one or more parties can bring 
an action on behalf of a  large class matching a particular description which 
includes absent or unidentified parties, except for those who have expressly 
chosen not to participate (for a discussion of the purposes and background to 
the reforms: see: Mulheron and Edlin, 2018, p. 224–227).
4 Rule 79 (2) In determining whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective 
proceedings for the purposes of paragraph (1)(c), the Tribunal shall take into account all 
matters it thinks fit, including—
(a) whether collective proceedings are an appropriate means for the fair and efficient 
resolution of the common issues;
(b) the costs and the benefits of continuing the collective proceedings;
(c) whether any separate proceedings making claims of the same or a similar nature have 
already been commenced by members of the class;
(d) the size and the nature of the class;
(e) whether it is possible to determine in respect of any person whether that person is or 
is not a member of the class;
(f) whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages; and
(g) the availability of alternative dispute resolution and any other means of resolving the 
dispute…
(3) In determining whether collective proceedings should be opt-in or opt-out proceedings, 
the Tribunal may take into account all matters it thinks fit, including the following matters 
additional to those set out in paragraph (2)— (a)the strength of the claims; and (b)whether 
it is practicable for the proceedings to be brought as opt-in collective proceedings, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the estimated amount of damages that individual 
class members may recover.
5 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297 and Joined cases C-295/04, 
297/04 and 298/04 Manfredi et al.v. Lloyd Adriatico assicurazioni Spa e Assitalia Spa, [2006] 
ECR I-6619; Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions 
for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union (EU Damages Directive).
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The calculation of damages for breach of competition law is a complex 
task which is based on a principle of full compensation, including actual 
loss, loss of profit and interest.6 Compensation means placing the injured 
party in the position it would have been in had there been no infringement 
(which requires consideration of the counterfactual). The calculation 
requires the estimation of complex economic and statistical data and the use 
of large datasets, which are both difficult and costly to obtain and analyse. 
Unlike competitors who may have the incentive and resources to undertake 
these calculations, consumers are faced with diminished (including rules 
regarding the disclosure of evidence) and costly access to this asymmetric 
information.7 
The proportionality of the costs and burdens on the injured party for the 
quantification of damages may be relevant to the EU principle of effectiveness. 
National law must provide an effective remedy which must not render 
excessively difficult or practically impossible the exercise of rights conferred 
on individuals. The EU Damages Directive (2014) states:
Member States shall ensure that neither the burden nor the standard of proof 
required for the quantification of harm renders the exercise of the right to damages 
practically impossible or excessively difficult. Member States shall ensure that 
the national courts are empowered, in accordance with national procedures, to 
estimate the amount of harm if it is established that a claimant suffered harm but 
it is practically impossible or excessively difficult precisely to quantify the harm 
suffered on the basis of the evidence available.8
The calculation of damages arising from a  cartel, the subject of this 
infringement, includes the ‘overcharge’ (higher prices, loss of profits) paid 
by the direct purchaser of the goods or services which were the subject of 
the cartel and the ‘volume effect’ (loss of volume of sales).9 The calculation 
of the ‘overcharge’ is based on the counterfactual, an estimate of the 
non-infringement price compared to the actual price paid by the customer. 
The calculation can be made on comparator (different product or geographic) 
markets.10 The compensation available to the direct purchaser may be fully 
 6 Damages do not include overcompensation by punitive, multiple or other damages: EU 
Damages Directive (2014), recitals 12, 13.
 7 EC, Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Draft Guidance Paper (June 2011); Com-
munication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages (2013/C 167/07).
 8 EU Damages Directive, Article 17.
 9 For a ‘buyer cartel’ there could also be an ‘undercharge’ for the supplier of the cartel. 
10 European Commission, Guidelines for national courts on how to estimate the share of the 
overcharge which was passed on to the indirect purchaser (2019) (Draft) [5.1] http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/passing_on_en.pdf.
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or partially (depending on level of competition and elasticity) passed on to 
customers, as indirect purchasers.11 
The collective action in this infringement dealt with the amount of 
overcharge paid by consumers as indirect purchasers.
IV. The facts in issue in Merricks v Mastercard
The action for collective damages arose from a  ‘follow-on’ action from 
a 19 December 2007 decision by the European Commission against Mastercard 
under Article 101 TFEU for the setting of a multilateral interchange fee 
(hereinafter: MIF) which resulted in higher fees being charged between 
acquiring banks.12 
The background to the claim was set out by the CAT in its decision of 
21 July 2017.
Mastercard operates what is commonly known as a  four party payment card 
scheme… (1) a  cardholder; (2) the cardholder’s bank (known as the “Issuing 
Bank”); (3) a merchant; and (4) the merchant’s bank (known as the “Acquiring 
Bank”). Issuing and Acquiring Banks … must pay fees to Mastercard to participate 
in the scheme and comply with the Mastercard Scheme Rules.. The Issuing Bank 
transmits payment to the Acquiring Bank, less a  transaction fee known as the 
interchange fee (“IF”). The Acquiring Bank in turn generally deducts the amount 
of the IF, along with a fee for its acquiring services, from the payment it makes to 
the merchant. The total deduction made by the Acquiring Bank from the amount 
paid to the merchant is called the merchant service charge (“MSC”). However, the 
IF accounts for the vast majority of the MSC. The Issuing Bank and the Acquiring 
Bank may have bilaterally agreed the level of IF that will apply to transactions 
between them, or in some cases they may be the same bank. But except for those 
situations, the level of the fee defaults to one set by Mastercard. This default fee 
is known as the multilateral interchange fee: the MIF… (i) where a card issued in 
one EEA Member State is used at a merchant based in a different EEA Member 
State, a cross-border MIF applies. This is the EEA MIF … which was the subject 
of the EC Decision.13
The European Commission found that the setting of the EEA MIF by 
Mastercard constituted a decision of an association of undertakings which had 
the object or effect of restricting competition in breach of Article 101 TFEU. 
11 EU Damages Directive, Article 12–14.
12 COMP/34.579 MasterCard (2007); European Commission, Commission prohibits 
MasterCard’s intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees, Memo IP/07/1959.
13 Merricks v Mastercard [2017] CAT 16 at [8]–[12] https://www.catribunal.org.uk/sites/
default/files/2.1266_Walter_Hugh_Judgment_CAT_16_210717.pdf.
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It was considered that the entire cost of the MIF was passed by the Acquiring 
Banks to merchants as part of the merchant service charge (hereinafter: MSC). 
Merricks sought the CAT’s approval to act as class representative on behalf 
of all UK residents who between 1992 and 2008 purchased goods or services 
from businesses in the UK which accepted Mastercard.14
V.  The requirements for certification 
of a Collective Proceedings Order (CPO)
The CAT found Merricks was a suitable class representative but refused 
the CPO for two main reasons: 
…a perceived lack of data to operate the proposed met hodology for determining 
the level of pass-on of the overcharges to consumers and the absence of any 
plausible means of calculating the loss of individual claimants so as to devise an 
appropriate method of distributing any aggregate award of damages.15 
The absence of a method of distribution of the damages award was 
considered to not be compensatory because it would bear no relation to the 
actual losses sustained by any individual member of the class.16  
Section 47B CA requires the CAT to determine the award of a CPO and 
its decision can only be challenged on judicial review ‘if it could be shown that 
it had misapplied the relevant legal test or had made a decision on the facts 
before it which no reasonable tribunal, properly directed as to the law, could 
have reached.’17 
On judicial review, the Court of Appeal found that the CAT had committed 
an error of law in applying the wrong test on two issues.
14 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [4]. Merrick’s claim also included an additional UK MIF 
fee deriving from intra-UK transactions between the issuing and acquiring banks. 
15 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [29].
16 In critiqui ng the ‘top-down’ aggregate methodology the CAT claimed that the aggregate 
method was defective because ‘if, hypothetically, a million people opted out of the proceedings, 
there would be no proper way of reducing the quantum of damages accordingly (and, conversely, 
of increasing it if a large number of people now domiciled outside the UK sought to opt in): it 
would simply lead to everyone in the class getting more (or less) money out of the total pot.’ 
Merricks [2017] CAT 16 [87]. This question should arguably not be determined however at the 
certification stage: see Mulheron and Edlin, above n. 7, 2018, p. 240–241.
17 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [12]. The Tribunal’s decision to grant or refuse a CPO 
can also be appealed to the Court of Appeal: Merricks v Mastercard [2018] EWCA Civ 2527.
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VI. The methodology for calculation of the ‘Pass-on’
The first issue was the method and feasibility of calculation of the aggregate 
award of damages and in particular the level of MSC pass-on to consumers 
during the infringement period. The collective claim relied on an expert report 
prepared by Dr Cento Veljanovski and Mr David Dearman. The experts 
acknowledged that the assessment for quantifying the loss was preliminary 
and would require the complex analysis of further data to be disclosed by 
Mastercard and market studies. The experts proposed a 3-step method of 
calculation of the volume of all relevant UK Mastercard transactions, the 
extent of the overcharge in respect of the EEA MIF and the proportion of 
the overcharge passed on to the proposed classes.
While it was common ground that the MSC overcharge was fully passed 
onto merchants, it was more difficult to determine the level of pass-on to 
consumers. The difficulties arise from the different time periods and product 
and market sectors subject to the charge in the UK economy. The experts 
assumed a single weighted average for the different levels of MSC Pass-on. In 
considering the likely level of the ‘pass-on’ rate, the experts placed considerable 
importance on the position taken by Mastercard and their experts in previous 
litigation. In a claim brought by Sainsbury’s, a UK supermarket, in  relation 
to the MSC, Mastercard’s expert evidence was to the effect that the level of 
pass-on by Sainsbury’s to consumers was closer to 100% than to 50%.18 
VII. The common issues of fact or law
The experts’ assessment was based on a ‘top-down’ method on a ‘global or 
class-wide basis in terms of the amount of th e overcharge passed on to consumers 
generally without the need to calculate how each member of the represented 
class was affected.19 To be eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings the 
claim must raise common issues of fact or law (s47B(6) CA). The CAT was 
concerned that the proposed methodology for calculating the level of pass-on 
of the MIFs from merchants to consumers as a wh ole, identifying a global loss 
suffered by consumers, may not constitute a common issue absent being able 
18 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [9]; Sainsbury’s v Mastercard [2016] CAT 11.
19 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [19].
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to show that each member of the class was in some way adversely affected in 
their own purchases during the infringement period.20 
The Court of Appeal pointed out however that the CAT had accepted that 
not all of the issues need to be common issues in order for the collective claim 
to be certified.21 There was also no requirement under Section 47C(2) CA 
to approach the assessment of an aggregate award through the medium of 
a calculation of individual loss.22 The Court stated that ‘[p]ass-on to consumers 
generally satisfies the test of commonality of issue necessary for certification.’23
VIII. The sufficiency of data for the grant of the CPO
While the CAT had accepted that a method of calculation of global 
loss through a weighted average pass-on was methodologically sound, they 
acknowledged that this required access to a wide range of data. Given the 
preliminary nature of the information available, the crucial question for the 
CAT was what amounts to ‘sufficient data’ for the methodology to be applied 
for the grant of the CPO? While the CAT did not expect a full analysis to be 
carried out ‘a proper effort would have had to be made to determine whether 
it is practicable by ascertaining what data is reasonable available’.24 
The CAT relied on the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pro-Sys 
Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp. [2013] SCC 57 (hereinafter: Microsoft), 
which considered overcharges paid to Microsoft for the purchase of software 
by indirect purchasers:
Accordingly, applying the Microsoft test (para 58 above), we are unpersuaded on 
the material before us that there is sufficient data available for this methodology 
to be applied on a sufficiently sound basis. It follows that we are not satisfied, and 
20 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [45].
21 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [46].
22 The Tribunal may make an award of damages in collective proceedings without 
undertaking an assessment of the amount of damages recoverable in respect of the claim of 
each represented person: Section 47C9(2) CA.
23 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [47]. The Court of Appeal stated that the ability to treat 
the loss caused to consumers as a class as a common issue ‘was dependent on the availability 
of an economic model and methodology that was capable of making that global (and therefore 
common) assessment’, citing the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v 
Microsoft Corp. [2013] SCC 57 at [115]: Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [43]; Section 4(1)(c) of 
the Canadian Competition Act 1985 requires the claims of the class members to raise common 
issues which are defined as meaning ‘common but not necessarily identical issues of fact’.
24 Merricks [2017] CAT 16 [77].
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indeed very much doubt, that the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of 
damages: see rule 79(2)(f).25 
The CAT went on to cite Rothstein J from the Microsoft judg ment: 
… the expert methodology must be sufficiently credible or plausible to establish some 
basis in fact for the commonality requirement. This means that the methodology 
must offer a realistic prospect of establishing loss on a class-wide basis so that, if 
the overcharge is eventually established at the trial of the common issues, there is 
a means by which to demonstrate that it is common to the class (i.e. that passing 
on has occurred). The methodology cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, 
but must be grounded in the facts of the particular case in question. There must 
be some evidence of the availability of the data to which the methodology is to 
be applied.26
While the CAT and Court of Appeal were not bound to follow  Canadian 
authorities, the Court of Appeal noted that they were useful, due to the 
similarities between the two class action provisions.27 The Court found 
however that the CAT had committed an error of law by applying the wrong 
test in setting the standard of evidence as too high for the CPO stage. The 
Court of Appeal stated:
It seems to us that at the cert ification stage the proposed representative must 
be able to demonstrate that the claim has a real prospect of success. To do so in 
this case he had to satisfy the CAT that the expert methodology was capable of 
assessing the level of pass-on to the represented class and that there was, or was 
likely to be, data available to operate that methodology. But it was not necessary 
at that stage for the proposed representative to be able to produce all of that 
evidence, still less to enter into a detailed debate about its probative value.28
The Court of Appeal went on to state:
The availability o f data sufficient to allow the methodology to be operated on what 
the CAT described as a sufficiently sound basis ought at the certification stage 
to be looked at in terms of what information can be made available for use at 
the trial.29 
25 Merricks [2017] CAT 16 [78].
26 Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp. [2013] SCC 57 [118], cited by Merricks [2017] 
CAT 16 [58].
27 The Court of App eal stated: ‘Our view is that the CAT was right to treat the Canadian 
jurisprudence on certification as informing the correct approach. Most of the provinces in 
Canada have enacted class proceedings legislation (not limited to competition cases)’: Merricks 
[2019] EWCA Civ 674 [40]. For a  thorough review of the Canadian and United States class 
action jurisprudence relating to this case: see Mulheron and Edlin, 2018.
28 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [44].
29 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [50].
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It was sufficient at certification stage that the proposed methodology 
was credible, ‘it was not appropriate at the certification stage to require the 
proposed representative and his experts to specify in detail what data would be 
available for each of the relevant retail sectors in respect of the infringement 
period.’30
The CAT had rather carried out a  form of mini-trial and re quired the 
representative to establish more than a  reasonably arguable case,31 which 
therefore ‘exposed the claim to a more vigorous proc ess of examination than 
would have taken place at a strike-out application.’32 This also ignored that 
certification is a continuing process under which a CPO may be varied or 
revoked at any time (s.47B(9)).33 At the certification stage, the proposed 
representative should not ‘be required to demonstrate more than that he has 
a real prospect of success. This is not the test which the CAT applied.’34 
IX. The method of distribution of the aggregate award
The second issue for the refusal by the CAT of the CPO concerned the 
proposed method of distribution of the aggregate award which the CAT stated 
would bear no relation to the actual loss suffered by individual members of 
the class and therefore conflict with the principle of compensation of damages.
This issue was related to the methodology of seeking to calculate the loss 
on a top-down, aggregate basis and seeking to award the class on a per capita 
basis for each separate year of the infringement period and ‘not on the basis of 
a common issue concerning loss suffered by each member (or most members) 
of the class’.35
The Court of Appeal however found that the CAT had committed an error 
of law by wrongly directing itself to refuse certification by reference to the 
proposed distribution method.36 Section 47B and the Rules do not determine 
any particular form of distribution and the provisions are open-ended.37 
The CAT is merely required to determine whether the claims are suitable for 
30 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [51].
31 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [52].
32 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [53]. Williams and Bates query whether this lower 
standard is in keeping with the ‘strong safeguard’ envisaged by the UK Government in devising 
the collective proceedings scheme: See Williams and Bates, 2019, p. 333.
33 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [53].
34 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [54].
35 Merricks [2017] CAT 16 [87].
36 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [62].
37 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [60].
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an aggregate award of damages and this does not include the assessment of 
individual loss (Rule 79(2)(f)). The actual mode of distribution need also not 
be considered at the certification stage, as it is a matter for determination 
at trial.38
The purpose of a  collective action is to encourage suits not available 
individually, and so to require the calculation of individual loss for the 
authorisation of a  distribution at the CPO stage would largely negate 
these large-scale opt-out proceedings.39 The Court of Appeal stated: ‘[t]he 
vindication of the rights of individual claimants is achieved by the aggregate 
award itself.’40 
The Court of Appeal set aside the order and remitted it to the CAT for 
re-hearing.
X. Conclusion
The Court of Appeal decision in Merrricks provides an important indicator 
of the likely success of future collective proceedings under the new UK regime. 
The standard set by the Court of Appeal that the claim at the CPO stage has 
a  ‘real prospect of success’ whereby the expert methodology is capable of 
assessing the pass-on (credible) and there is (or likely to be) data available to 
operate that methodology, is a fairly low threshold that will encourage future 
cases. 
The Court has also found that to make the aggregate award of damages 
subject to the assessment of the loss suffered and recoverable by each individual 
would annul the purpose of the power to make collective awards. Williams and 
Bates argue that this approach ‘effectively dispenses with the requirement for 
each, or even any, of the individual claims comprised within a collective action 
to be made out. Instead, the requirement for loss to be shown (which is normally 
a necessary ingredient of a claim for breach of statutory duty) is replaced with 
a requirement that some (not necessarily identified or identifiable) members 
of the class suffered loss (Williams and Bates, 2019, p. 335). But as Mulheron 
and Edlin point out, the compensatory principle is not statutorily mandated 
under the new collective scheme (Mulheron and Edlin, 2018, p. 242) and the 
representative ‘is not expected to produce a methodology that each and every 
class member suffered some loss.’41 While s47B(1) CA provides that collective 
38 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [62].
39 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [57].
40 Merricks [2019] EWCA Civ 674 [61].
41 Ibidem, 235.
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proceedings may be brought ‘combining two or more claims’, it is clear that 
they are perceived to differ from a mere summation of individual claims. 
The reliance by the Court of Appeal and the CAT on Canadian jurisprudence 
will provide an important source of interpretation for future certification 
decisions. The Canadian Supreme Court noted in the Microsoft case that 
the methodology ‘cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical but must be 
grounded in the facts.’42 The Canadian court stressed the importance of 
certification as a ‘meaningful screening device’ and the ‘standard for assessing 
evidence at certification does not give rise to “a determination of the merits of 
the proceeding” (CPA, s. 5(7)); nor does it involve such a superficial level of 
analysis into the sufficiency of the evidence that it would amount to nothing 
more than symbolic scrutiny.’43
In assessing these questions and ensuring that the CPO is a  ‘meaningful 
screening device’ it may be difficult for future Tribunals to effectively draw 
the line between conducting a ‘mini trial’ and establishing a ‘real prospect of 
success’ that is grounded in fact. At the same time, given the complexities and 
costs faced by representatives to access and analyze data at the CPO stage, if 
the CAT applies the correct test in future cases it may be difficult to set aside 
cases on judicial review because these questions, in the absence of error of law, 
are for the CAT to decide. The judgment provides a strong statement of the 
legal test that the CAT should observe at the certification stage and reasserts 
the importance of the collective proceedings as a valuable means of redress 
for competition law damages. The decision has now been appealed to the UK 
Supreme Court where these issues may be further clarified. If upheld by the 
Supreme Court, it will be interesting to observe how the CAT deals with both 
this remitted and future decisions.
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